Egg-manning: Arguing with the fringes

I've been thinking more about writer Dan Brooks's post about the death of the Straw Man and the rise of the Egg Man. I'm not in love with Brooks's name for this "egg-manning" phenomenon (for one thing, googling it currently yields pictures of Peyton Manning being egged, which I'm not necessarily opposed to, but is indicative of the requirement of lexical singularity in the age of Google). So far, I've only been able to find one other use of it online (by blogger Tim Hall). But as I read more opinion pieces on both mainstream news websites like the New York Times and encounter news via social media (on Facebook and Twitter, where the person sharing the opinion piece is, in effect, endorsing the argument), I keep returning to this concept.

While straw-manning involves making up an imaginary person who holds a view opposed to your own just so that you can refute it, egg-manning involves finding a real person advancing a real view on social media just so that you can refute it. Finding an actual person essentially justifies the necessity of making your argument. There really are people who must be argued against!

Straw-manning involved assuming that someone out there disagrees with your argument. Egg-manning does not assume this, but instead makes another, typically unstated, assumption. The assumption that egg-manners make is that the person making the argument opposed to their own is part of a large, influential group of people, and that the expression of the argument is part of a larger trend. Rarely is any particular opinion held by only one person; you can search for a hashtag or a term or through various interconnected bits of the blogosphere or social news networks and usually find hundreds or maybe thousands of examples of the argument which you wish to argue against.

The next step in the assumption is the implicit or explicit linking of these hundreds or thousands of people actually stating the argument online with a larger mainstream group that, while not actually stating the argument, has stated or acted in such ways that makes it clear that they believe in some of the same things as the group that actually states the argument online. Most often in the U.S., these large mainstream groups are liberals/Democrats or conservatives/Republicans. Sometimes, they're smaller and/or more amorphous groups, like racists, sexists, Tea-Partiers, Social Justice Warriors, fraternity brothers, hipsters, or many other groups that are partially defined by their stated beliefs and actions. The largest, most amorphous group to be argued against in the U.S. right now is The Establishment. Dissimilarities between ideas held by the small group actually stating the argument online and the large group not stating the argument are ignored in favor of whatever they have in common, which, to the egg-manner, represents a coherent ideological framework.

Even if that group of people isn't large right now, it could become large in the future if its ideas are not argued against. Often times, an example from history is provided to show how quickly ideas can spread if they are not forcefully countered with another argument, a time when silence sealed the fate of a people. In the past, small, vocal groups of people got large less-vocal groups to go along with them. This is intended to make it clear that arguing against a dangerous idea is not so much an act of participating in civil discourse (and thus not subject to the informal rules of civil discourse), but a kind of duty, and that to fail to argue against it would constitute negligence of one's duty.

Sometimes, the egg-manners are correct, as many people who assume things tend to be every now and then: a dangerous view that once was fringe becomes mainstream. It can happen quickly with viral spread of ideas through social media. But other times, the egg-manners are incorrect. The view never becomes one held by more than an un-influential, fringe group online. Of course, if you are able to indefinitely postpone the point at which you believe the fringe idea will become mainstream, you can never be proven wrong, but if we were to require that the aforementioned assumptions be tested (which requires setting a finite time frame in which the fringe idea would become mainstream), I think that many assumptions like this would turn out not to be true.

Then there is the possibility of a backfiring effect: that by arguing against the fringe idea, egg-manners give legitimacy to it, thus bringing about its popularity. Not only are egg-manners raising the profile of ideas with which they argue; they are also providing more examples of opposite arguments for the egg-manners on the other side of argument to use in their egg-manning. There's likely an emotional component to the way in which egg-manning fuels that which it seeks to fight: anger from one side fuels anger from the other.

It's unclear whether egg-manners consider their arguments to be "arguments" in the traditional sense - attempts to convince another person of the truth and/or to provide support for a like-minded person who feels alone - or whether they consider them to be acts of self-expression. If it is the former, the egg-manner should care about the impact of the argument. But if it is the latter, being wrong and ineffective may not matter. It's a rhetorical maneuver that continues to interest me. If only it had a better name.

Perception Becoming Reality: The Effects of Framing Polls and Early Primary Election Results on Perceived Electability and Voting Behavior

National polls (and, in the coming weeks, the results of early primaries) present potentially misleading information about presidential primary candidates' chances of winning the eventual nomination. The actual likelihood depends on a several facets of the primary electoral process: how many delegates are assigned by the voters of each state; whether or not a state is winner-take-all; "triggers" and "thresholds" to allocate delegates to particular candidates; when a given state votes during the process. Add to that the effect of whether or not other candidates drop out of the race and who those voters then decide to vote for.

A lot of this can, and has, been modeled. You can model how many people would vote for each candidate in each state (even if there isn't accurate polling data in some states) based on what you know about the relationship between, say, education and likelihood to support a particular candidate. You can know who each voter's second, third, or fourth choice would likely be (i.e., how things will shake out when candidates start dropping out of the race). You can know what the rules are for delegate allocation in each state and how many delegates are in each state. When you take all of this into account, at least for the Republican candidates right now, you end up with a disjuncture between what the polls and what the early primary results will likely be (Trump and Cruz well ahead of Rubio) and who would actually get the most delegates if the primaries were to all be conducted today (Rubio, probably).

The crazy thing about this is that the emphasis on current national polls and early primary results in the  media (which, as far as I'm concerned, is a misleading picture of how people would vote if the primaries were all held today) might change later primary voters' perceptions of the electability of their favored candidate, causing them to abandon that candidate and switch to another one.

Surely, there will be some people voting in later polls who will "stand their ground" and still vote for their favored candidates, regardless of what national polls or early primary elections say. Also, there are many reasons why those voting in later primaries may change their opinion over the coming months: for example they may get more information about the candidates, or their favored candidate may say or do something they don't like. But I think at least one possible cause of switching candidates has to do with perceived electability, and that perceived electability could be based on the misleading information from national polls and early primary results.

So then, how will the misleading information sway voters?

My guess is that Trump and Sanders (and possibly Cruz) will keep referring to the polls and the early primary results, claiming it to be evidence of their electability. They would do this in hopes of a herding effect. For Republicans, people in late-voting states who would've voted for Rubio will see supporting Rubio as supporting a likely loser. Spending time and energy supporting him would be a waste, and possibly embarrassing. This would cause them to abandon Rubio and either fall in line with the herd developing around Trump and/or Cruz (likely due to an "anyone but Hillary" sentiment) or sit out the primary vote altogether. For the Democrats, Hillary supporters residing in late-voting states who were on the fence and perhaps supported Hillary only because they thought Bernie didn't have a shot would think that Bernie did have a shot, and switch over to Bernie.

However, this strategy of emphasizing national polls and early primaries might backfire for Trump. He'll keep saying he's winning and will successfully convince people he's likely to win the nomination, but this might freak other voters out ("oh my god, he could actually win!"). This might cause people who would have sat on the sidelines to vote against him. It might cause wealthy donors to throw more money at Cruz or Rubio. It might cause other candidates to drop out sooner and endorse Cruz or Rubio. Call this the "panic mode" reaction to the perception that Trump could win.

There are, of course, many X factors that could swing the election: the economy tanks, someone says something stupid, scandals, terrorist attacks, etc. But I think one factor is whether people think national polls and early primary results predict eventual electability. And whether people think this depends on what they hear both from the candidates themselves and from the news.

The news will likely present a "horse-race" framing of the election, not because they want Trump or Cruz or Sanders to win, but because they want a close race, because it's a simpler story, and because this will boost ratings. There is a chance that some news outlets (I'm looking at you, NPR and NYTimes) will try to convey the complex relationship between staggered primaries with various delegate allocation rules and public opinion. I think the likelihood of any of the above scenarios playing out depends on whether news outlets use the simple, misleading frame or the more nuanced one.

How Election Coverage Can Decide Elections

I've been thinking about the press coverage of Reverend Wright's recent speeches, in particular the coverage of the major cable news networks and the NYTimes, though I'd suspect what holds true for these outlets holds true for most media. All agree that there are two priorities that, at times, conflict with one another: getting a certain candidate elected (Obama) and that candidate or other high-profile people linked (however vaguely) to the candidate being able to speak their minds. How much must one sacrifice in order to get elected? How many games does a candidate have to play?

To answer the question, you have to look at the poll numbers. Its a common complaint that the public is too focused on poll numbers, not focused enough on the issues, and this is b/c the news media frames elections as "horse races." I think that heavy use of the "horse race" frame (which emphasizes poll #s over all else) leads to more frequent/larger shifts in those numbers. That is, the more self-aware a public becomes of its opinion, the more likely it is to shift. The reasons for the shift are essentially arbitrary. It might be Reverend Wright, it might be "bitter-gate." There will always be something that either the competing candidate, the news media, or bloggers who support the competing candidate will exploit, either to get their candidate elected, to raise their own stature as "opinion leader," and/or to boost their ratings and make a profit. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann's Spiral of Silence sums up this brilliantly. Its a must-read for anyone who is genuinely trying to understand why the primary is going the way it is going.

Fluctuations in polls are not due to the larger public's reaction to an event (like Wright's "controversial" remarks on race), nor are they the inevitable result of increasingly visible poll numbers per se (hating the pollsters and the NYTimes for posting poll #s gets us nowhere). The larger public reacts to professional interpretation of minor fluctuations in public opinion. First, the media (main stream or bloggers, doesn't matter) select an event which they can interpret as "controversial" enough to plausibly effect voter opinion. Then they limit their polling to one small but purportedly influential segment of the general populace (undecideds, superdelegates, other bloggers, white working class females between 25-40 since last Tuesday). How long this time period is and what the event happens to be are of no consequence. Both main stream media and bloggers will dig until they find an event that can be spun as controversial and a small enough sliver of the public to show that there is some movement in the polls that is plausibly correlated to that event. In doing this, they justify their own existence. They are the source of information about public opinion, and our conception of public opinion is, for better or worse, what we base our voting decisions on (if you don't believe this, read Noelle-Neumann's book).

This creates a cycle: larger and larger segments of the population accept the premise that public opinion is being altered by the event, making the connection between the event and public opinion ever more plausible.

It becomes acceptable (perhaps laudable) to change one's position on a candidate. This is the "change" election in the sense that voters are expected to change their opinion on candidates several times over the course of the year.

Why does all this work against Obama? Maybe b/c he was ahead, and favorite-toppled-by-underdog makes for a more compelling story than underdog-can't-come-back, which is why both candidates were trying so desperately to frame themselves as underdogs. It doesn't help that most people who publicly rush to Obama's defense are perceived by many as elite (the digerati, the NYTimes).

I think that the new technology and the ways it allows information to spread changes how public opinion fluctuates and so it changes how our leaders are elected. The first step is to understand how it works, to give up, for a moment, our dreams of perfect democracy or a perfect candidate as well as our nightmares of a totalitarian mainstream media cabal. Just take a step back and try to see how it all works. Then you can make your value judgment and think about how you might change the system. Personally, I think that the way out of this bind is...another technological innovation. I've seen innovations on assessing user demand work on small scales, on YouTube or within online communities that introduced wiki-ratings or similar widgets. Different tools, all under the heading of "new media" or "internet," can change the flow of public opinion and could get us to recognize how we're all shaped by public opinion and yet all have the power to resist it and decide things based on judgments of the candidates and the issues.