Egg-manning: Arguing with the fringes

I've been thinking more about writer Dan Brooks's post about the death of the Straw Man and the rise of the Egg Man. I'm not in love with Brooks's name for this "egg-manning" phenomenon (for one thing, googling it currently yields pictures of Peyton Manning being egged, which I'm not necessarily opposed to, but is indicative of the requirement of lexical singularity in the age of Google). So far, I've only been able to find one other use of it online (by blogger Tim Hall). But as I read more opinion pieces on both mainstream news websites like the New York Times and encounter news via social media (on Facebook and Twitter, where the person sharing the opinion piece is, in effect, endorsing the argument), I keep returning to this concept.

While straw-manning involves making up an imaginary person who holds a view opposed to your own just so that you can refute it, egg-manning involves finding a real person advancing a real view on social media just so that you can refute it. Finding an actual person essentially justifies the necessity of making your argument. There really are people who must be argued against!

Straw-manning involved assuming that someone out there disagrees with your argument. Egg-manning does not assume this, but instead makes another, typically unstated, assumption. The assumption that egg-manners make is that the person making the argument opposed to their own is part of a large, influential group of people, and that the expression of the argument is part of a larger trend. Rarely is any particular opinion held by only one person; you can search for a hashtag or a term or through various interconnected bits of the blogosphere or social news networks and usually find hundreds or maybe thousands of examples of the argument which you wish to argue against.

The next step in the assumption is the implicit or explicit linking of these hundreds or thousands of people actually stating the argument online with a larger mainstream group that, while not actually stating the argument, has stated or acted in such ways that makes it clear that they believe in some of the same things as the group that actually states the argument online. Most often in the U.S., these large mainstream groups are liberals/Democrats or conservatives/Republicans. Sometimes, they're smaller and/or more amorphous groups, like racists, sexists, Tea-Partiers, Social Justice Warriors, fraternity brothers, hipsters, or many other groups that are partially defined by their stated beliefs and actions. The largest, most amorphous group to be argued against in the U.S. right now is The Establishment. Dissimilarities between ideas held by the small group actually stating the argument online and the large group not stating the argument are ignored in favor of whatever they have in common, which, to the egg-manner, represents a coherent ideological framework.

Even if that group of people isn't large right now, it could become large in the future if its ideas are not argued against. Often times, an example from history is provided to show how quickly ideas can spread if they are not forcefully countered with another argument, a time when silence sealed the fate of a people. In the past, small, vocal groups of people got large less-vocal groups to go along with them. This is intended to make it clear that arguing against a dangerous idea is not so much an act of participating in civil discourse (and thus not subject to the informal rules of civil discourse), but a kind of duty, and that to fail to argue against it would constitute negligence of one's duty.

Sometimes, the egg-manners are correct, as many people who assume things tend to be every now and then: a dangerous view that once was fringe becomes mainstream. It can happen quickly with viral spread of ideas through social media. But other times, the egg-manners are incorrect. The view never becomes one held by more than an un-influential, fringe group online. Of course, if you are able to indefinitely postpone the point at which you believe the fringe idea will become mainstream, you can never be proven wrong, but if we were to require that the aforementioned assumptions be tested (which requires setting a finite time frame in which the fringe idea would become mainstream), I think that many assumptions like this would turn out not to be true.

Then there is the possibility of a backfiring effect: that by arguing against the fringe idea, egg-manners give legitimacy to it, thus bringing about its popularity. Not only are egg-manners raising the profile of ideas with which they argue; they are also providing more examples of opposite arguments for the egg-manners on the other side of argument to use in their egg-manning. There's likely an emotional component to the way in which egg-manning fuels that which it seeks to fight: anger from one side fuels anger from the other.

It's unclear whether egg-manners consider their arguments to be "arguments" in the traditional sense - attempts to convince another person of the truth and/or to provide support for a like-minded person who feels alone - or whether they consider them to be acts of self-expression. If it is the former, the egg-manner should care about the impact of the argument. But if it is the latter, being wrong and ineffective may not matter. It's a rhetorical maneuver that continues to interest me. If only it had a better name.

Are School Shootings Becoming the New Norm?

It's a familiar story: a string of low-probability/high-consequence events capture the front pages and they become the subject of public discourse, including plenty of editorials. Once it was airplane hijackings or serial killings. Now, it's school shootings. We need to do something to stop this trend of horrible events. In most cases, it's beyond debate whether or not the events are horrible. But are they indicative of trends (i.e., an increase over the prior frequency level of similar horrible events)?

Recently, a statistic has been making the rounds on blogs, social media, and in the mainstream news: 74 school shootings have occurred since the shootings at Sandy Hook in late 2012. The statistic comes from a group that has a rather explicit agenda: Everytown for Gun Safety. While it does give us some information about an important social phenomenon, my initial feeling about this statistic is that when taken out of context (and it is almost always shown without any context), it is apt to mislead.

First, there's the question of how we define "similar events". Do we count incidents in which guns were discharged but didn't kill anyone, or injure anyone? Do we count homicides related to drug deals? Do we count suicides? Do we count accidental gun discharges? Do we count colleges as well as elementary and secondary schools? In the case of the above statistic, Everytown for Gun Safety has counted all of these as "school shootings".

Why does it matter how inclusive our definition of "school shootings" is? Aren't all of these shootings horrible events that we should seek to avoid? In my opinion, yes, absolutely. However, if we're trying to understand a certain social phenomenon and whether a string of recent events are part of a trend, broad definitions only muddy the water. The social and psychological processes involved in suicide-by-gun at or near schools is likely to be different in important ways than those processes as they are applied to individuals like Adam Lanza and Elliot Rodger. Obviously the common denominators are "school" and "gun", and if you're of the mind that gun control is the ONLY solution to the problem of any kind of school shooting, then you may not care about the differences. But you should. Even if you're in favor of gun control and you think it will cut down on the number of people who die each year in school shootings, it won't help to ignore other factors, and I think overly-broad definitions of "school shootings" encourage this kind of ignorance. Is the increase in school shootings due to an increase in angry-young-males lashing out at the world, an increase in drug/gang-related shootings, or both? In order to address the issue, it's important to know.

Is it really a trend? If you just tell someone how many incidents occurred in one year, that doesn't really give them a good idea of whether or not it is part of a potentially alarming trend. This is the real reason I'm writing about this. I was genuinely curious. I wanted to know if the headlines were part of a familiar kind of hysteria about a random rash of low-probability/high-consequence events or if they're on to something. It wasn't easy to tell just by reading the news or the blogs. But there IS data on this. It ain't perfect data, but I think it may help me get an answer, this is one of the things I absolutely love about today's Internet - you have access to data and can see for yourself whether there is evidence to support a conclusion.

I used this list from Wikipedia of school shootings in the U.S., defined as "incidents in which a firearm was discharged at a school infrastructure, including incidents of shootings on a school bus." It included K-12 schools as well as colleges and universities, so the definition is pretty similar to that used by Everytown for Gun Safety. The list draws from newspaper archives. By virtue of their newsworthiness, school shootings seem unlikely to have ever gone unreported, so I think we can safely assume that this list is a fairly accurate record of school shootings and doesn't contain much in the way of systematic measurement error. 

Before I show you what I found, take a moment to guess: how many school shootings do you think there were in 1880? How about 1904? 1970?

(scroll down for the answers!)














Here's what I found:

So yeah, it does seem like there's something crazy going on in the last 18 months if you define school shooting this way. Why do I designate the last 18 months as the time period to pay attention to? It's about the time that the Adam Lanza killings occurred, and it's also near the beginning of the year, but these aren't good reasons to use this date as a cut-off. But if you look at the number of shootings per month, they really seem to go up in January of 2013.

There is plenty of seemingly random year-to-year variation across the whole 164 year period, but the number of incidents tend to fluctuate between 0 and 5 per year. It's worth noting that the last year there were no school shootings was 1981, so you could use that as a the beginning of the trend if you really wanted to.

It was weird for me to read about children shooting themselves in the early 1900's at school. It doesn't fit with my conception of the culture at the time. So school shootings aren't unprecedented, but after looking at this data, it seems hard to deny that the problem has gotten much worse in the past few years (or possibly since 1995 or 2005). If there were, say, 10 school shootings in 2013, I think you could possibly say that it was due to random variation. But there have been 31 in the first half of 2014!

What if we dig a bit deeper and look at the circumstances around each shooting. Do we see differences between the shootings from, say, the early 1900's and the shootings of today? In my search through the shootings since the 1850's in schools, I tried to isolate ones that I thought were similar to Sandy Hook: not suicide; not accidental; and not directed at one particular individual for reasons of, say, revenge or a rejection; not gang-related. I call this kind of shooting "mass school shootings". I include cases in which an individual clearly attempted a mass school shooting but was thwarted (though there are only a few of these, so they don't make much of a difference). Again, I must emphasize: I'm not saying that those other kinds of shootings aren't problems that need to be solved, but only that I want to isolate Sandy-Hook-ish shootings to see if there is indeed a trend. Here's what I found:

Note that the Y axis is different than the Y axis in the first graph. If I had used the same Y axis in both graphs (or included both lines in the same graph), it would've been hard to see the mass shootings line, so this is why I used two different y axes.

If you look at most of the school shootings pre-1966, they're directed at a particular individual and the motives are typically revenge (for a bad grade or being rebuffed by a would-be lover). Again, it was weird to read about mass school shootings similar to Sandy Hook that took place in the 1800's (though there were just two, so it really was anomalous).

As you can see, there's a similar pattern to the pattern in the overall school shootings: not much happens until recently. But what do we mean by "recently"? You could easily put the starting point of the trend at 1985, the first year there were more than two separate incidents of mass school shootings. What about since Sandy Hook? Let's take a closer look at the data, starting at 1985:

So, 1985 was a bad year, and so were 1988, 1998 (the 90's in general were pretty bad for this type of thing) and 2006. 2013 (the only post-Sandy-Hook year in our data set) is bad, but not much worse than these other years. In the first half of 2014, there have been three mass school shootings, but it would be dangerous to extrapolate from that and estimate that there will be six for the year. Extrapolation with such small sample sizes rarely maps on to reality.

In the end, here's what I get from this little exercise. The truth, such as I can determine it from available evidence, is that school shootings in general have become a lot more common in the last 18 months, but it seems unwarranted to say that Sandy-Hook-style mass school shootings have become a lot more common in that same time period. If you wanted to identify a starting point for the cultural phenomenon of mass school shootings, you'd be better off going back to 1985. If I'm looking for a culprit or cause of this phenomenon, I wouldn't look at things that are going on right now in our culture and in our laws. I would look at things that have been around and haven't changed much since 1985.

As would be the case with any phenomenon, my attitude would change if new evidence warranted such a change. If there were no more school shootings this year, I'd stick to my interpretation: nothing new in the world of mass school shootings since '85. BUT if there were 3 or more, then I'd reconsider my outlook.

From looking at this data, I also get the impression that there is an urgent problem with shootings at schools, but that this problem isn't akin to the problem of Sandy Hook or Columbine. Like any compassionate person, I'm appalled at that rapid increase in school shootings you see in the first graph, and I want to know more about why it's occurring and what we can do to stop it. A lot of these school shootings are committed by sane people who have a deep disagreement with another person and (importantly) access to guns. If anything, I think this analysis makes the case of those who choose to pin the problem of school shootings on a lack of proper mental health care and not on gun availability (I'm looking at you, Wayne LaPierre!) a lot weaker. School shootings are skyrocketing, according to the evidence, and most incidents don't involve mental health issues as such. So, maybe addressing the issues of gun availability, conflict resolution, and, perhaps, a cultural component may be an effective way to lessen the number of overall school shootings.

This analysis does NOT make for an easily conveyed, pithy soundbite. Because they need something pithy, the news and bloggers and others have latched on to a pithy-put-misleading alternative - the "74 since Sandy Hook" stat. On the one hand, this stat may grab more people's attention, gets them to click and gets them to post. On the other hand, based on all the evidence I can see, it IS misleading. It's use opens up those trying to convince others of the severity of the issue to attacks based on their use of misleading statistics.

This is, I would say, a familiar story in the use of statistics related to emotionally-loaded, low-probability/high-consequence events. It's a story that's worth returning to when discussing media literacy.

One final note: in my search for information about this topic, I found this article on CNN that actually DID dig a little deeper and found results similar to my own. They found a few more "Sandy-Hook-like" shootings because their definition differed slightly from mine, and (importantly) they had no historical comparison so they can't really talk about trends, but still, it gave me hope for more context when reporting stats in news. Big ups to CNN (though you really need to stop with the auto-playing videos).

Data source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_school_shootings_in_the_United_States#cite_ref-47

Washington Week in Review 2: How Bills Become Laws

We don't have to shrug our shoulders and cynically declare that the inner workings of Washington are too byzantine to understand, though when you get into the nitty-gritty of telecom policy, it can be tempting to reach such a conclusion. That shit seems to be written by lawyers, for lawyers.

How do we combat this cynicism? To quote one of my favorite professors, “start with the obvious.” This is an advantage of being an outsider: you may not have the expertise to really know the specifics and complexities of how things work, but you can see things in a light that insiders have long since lost the ability to see. This approach might oversimplify things, but it gets all the assumptions on the table, gets to the root of what people believe in and where the disagreements are.

I’m making claims about things that are inherently, intentionally obscure. It’s in people’s best interest to not talk about how things really work in Washington. You might never see a documentary about it, but maybe reporters or people who are involved in it write fictionalized versions (or tell-alls) afterward. I have but one keyhole to look through, one story to present.

The government is just another large group of people, albeit with some rules that don’t apply to other groups like families or businesses. People in groups behave in fairly predictable ways.

There’s a lot of speculation about people’s behaviors and motivations on the parts of both activists and legislators. There certainly isn’t the assumption that some people are inherently evil or wrong, which seems to be outsiders’ perspective on politicians, lawyers, and big businessmen. Here, there’s a tacit assumption that politicians, like everyone else, care about their careers above all else. But this isn’t the same as just caring about money. Careers have to do with respect, status, and future earnings. The justification: As long as you have a family to support and you can imagine a rainy day in the future (which isn't that hard to imagine these days), the maintenance of a career is not greed. Its survival.

We need to remember that in most cases, politicians are only going to be in office for a few years, so they ally themselves with certain people (often in an industry). They make sure not to piss off industry people for two reasons

#1 Those industry people can help politicians get re-elected by donating large sums of $ to their campaign. The connection between campaign operating budget and success is well established, but I think it is flawed for the simple reason that it assumes that money = visibility = votes. Yes, there is some connection there, but its grossly overstated by the self-justifying media, in the same way that the effects of advertising are grossly overstated (and what is a politician but another product to be marketed?). It assumes the use and effects of old-school, one-way, extremely costly media and does not take into account word-of-mouth, viral, low-cost media.

Don't get me wrong: one-way media still has more of an impact than the internet, but I wouldn't be surprised if its impact is lessened and its value diminished in future elections. If that gets to be the case, then a certain amount of money will be required to gain some initial name recognition, but from there, more money will not necessarily equal more popularity. Look at the world of music. Yes, most of the people at the top of the charts were products of big label ad campaigns from the beginning. But others are not. Others are just skilled at marketing themselves. Or just plain skilled. This is a function of the falling cost of distribution of information about people's reputations, their talents, and what they believe in. There's no reason why it won't effect politics in the similar ways. Its just more information, just more personalities to package.

#2 Politicians need jobs after they leave office. The stakes are very high. If they decide to legislate in a way that is sympathetic to the industry, they get a very high paying cushy job. If not, they might get blacklisted and not be able to work in the industry at all.

Politicians care about getting re-elected, so they care about votes and what the people think. The will of the people tends to be a very vague concept based on calls, emails, letters to them, polls, etc. None of those have inherent value. They only have value in so far as they reflect that person’s future voting behavior and their ability to convince others to vote a certain way. If you frame yourself as an influential member of your community, then you’re liable to get farther than if you’re just one person. The politicians are concerned with the behavior of the voters, to some degree.

Activists want certain bills to get passed. They’re concerned with the behavior of the politicians. They frame issues by highlighting how many voters in their district want that bill to pass, so that if the politicians want to get re-elected, they should co-sponsor the bill. Also, activists frame the passage of a bill in terms of the bearing it will have on the internal allegiances and hierarchies within the organization of congress. The chances that any bill has to pass depends on who gets elected. That's what makes Washington so interesting and unlike companies or academia (at least in theory, if incumbents didnt' win 4 out of 5 elections): the frequent turnover keeps you from just figuring out how to please one person and instead everything is qualified by who might get elected or appointed in a year or two. There are contingencies for various scenarios, different angles to work. No one really knows what kind of legislation is going to go through 6 months from now b/c no one knows who is going to be the next president or congressperson.

For the activists, it becomes a question of how to frame the issue to highlight the advantages for other people (politicians, voters, people in the industry), to get them to realize that, hey, there’s something in it for them. I keep using the word "frame" b/c, from my POV, that's what its all about, more than truth, more than what's right, even more than money: rhetoric. It is therefore no surprise that there are plenty of lawyers in Washington, being as they are schooled in the art of rhetoric. But why aren’t there more behavioral psychologists? Maybe b/c people would balk at voting for someone with that kind of degree b/c it means they’re skilled at manipulating people, whereas lawyers sometimes do good things for people? Personally, I'd rather have a skilled psychologist fighting for me on the Hill than a lawyer.

Washington Week in Review

I feel obliged to write about my experience as an intern for the Media & Democracy Coalition here in Washington DC. This wasn't my first instinct, given that policy is not my area of expertise, and so I imagined that I'd have more to gain from and little to add to the online conversation about media policy. But since this is a fairly unique opportunity for a media scholar to see how the sausage gets made (is it me or is this metaphor becoming more and more popular?), I thought I'd write about it, albeit from the perspective of an under-informed outsider.

Today, I attended a meeting put on my the Media Access Project with two representatives of the presidential candidates, a representative from Skype, and one from AT&T. They talked about what the next administration would do regarding telecom policy in the next 4 years. For the most part, there were no surprises. I was reminded of everything that frustrates me about political discussion. You have two sides of an ideological divide stating and re-stating their beliefs on one central issue: what actions do legislators and businesses take in order to bring about the broadest benefits for all? One side privileges government regulation. The other privileges unfettered markets. Both of them speak in familiar generalities. When they do recognize that regulation might be appropriate for some circumstances and not for others, they don't talk about the attributes of that circumstance (say, the rate at which people adopt a technology, or the rate at which the cost of a product falls). Instead, they point to the fact that innovation occurred after a certain policy was enacted. One side interprets the innovation as an acceptable level while the other sees it as less than what could have been under a different policy. In the real world situations that they're comparing, they cannot make logical claims about causality between policy and innovation, but that doesn't stop them from doing so.

The whole discussion seems like posturing, just a way of publicly declaring, yet again, that the individuals in question (Obama, McCain, and their surrogates) stand where you would imagine them to stand on the issues. This kind of public posturing isn't without value. In a representative democracy, citizens need to be familiar with candidates so that they can make voting decisions based on something substantive. But is that all there is to such talks? Posturing in public, and decisions made to placate the wealthiest players behind closed doors? No.

I think that the answers to the questions being debated by these two sides can be found using behavioral media studies and behavioral economics. You could say, definitively, whether or not Skype was in direct competition with Verizon (and therefore deserving of the same kinds of regulation as Verizon) by finding out if a sample group of consumers acted as though the goods were substitutable given what they are bundled with (Skype with internet access, Verizon with cable TV and internet at a higher price). If they treat it as a substitutable good at a certain price, then it should be regulated like a service provider when sold below that price level.

You could see if regulation or deregulation of a communications market (be it at the application level or the equipment/backbone level) results in more innovation or less innovation by creating two parallel online environments where avatars are inclined to gain some resource (virtual $) and need to communicate with other avatars in order to compete or cooperate with them to achieve their goals. One of the environments has regulated communications competition and the other does not. Wait a few months, give the providers of the communications a chance to innovate or fail to innovate, and compare the results.

It wouldn't be prohibitively costly to run such studies. A few thousand dollars would get you properly motivated subjects and the environments needed to conduct the studies. You could say that parties with certain interests will fund certain studies that reinforce their stance on the matter (which has little to do with what is empirically true in terms of consumer behavior). This might have been true at one point. I wouldn't argue that, historically, behavioral economic studies had limited impact on policy and the everyday reality of businesses and consumers. But when the cost of conducting such experiments falls, along with the cost of disseminating transparent results and the cost of duplicating experiments, it becomes harder to propagate a lie about consumer behavior.

I'm not certain of this. Its just a hunch that came to me as I was listening to the candidates' proxies debate (it could've just as easily been telecom lobbyists on one side and NGOs and non-profits on the other). Information on behavior gets out there. People judge whether or not it is accurate, and if the results are really important to them (if they were trying to decide if a de-regulated biotech industry would come up w/ a cure for their cancer any faster than a regulated one), then they won't care about free market or socially conscious ideology. They'll care about accurate predictions and repeatable results. I'm placing my faith in the openness of information and lowering of barriers that the internet allows for. I'm assuming that this openness will somehow prevent politicians and businesspeople from propagating false information about behavior, that openness will make it so hard to maintain a lie that it will be easier to just work harder, honestly, to achieve your goals. People will do so not out of any moral inclination, but just b/c it'll be easier. Perhaps this faith is misplaced, but it seems like the best way to maintain my optimism in this town.